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FIRST DAY 
VIRGINIP. 301',,IW OF BAR EX .. 7\H.INERS 
Richmond, Virginia - Pebruary 25 1 1975 
FIRST·SECTION' 
l. Roger Benson is a building contractor in the City of 
Suffolk who specializes in the construction of dwelling houses. 
On May 1, 1974 Benson entered into a written contract with Thomas 
Newcomb by uhich Benson agreed to construct for Newcomb in the 
City of Suffolk a dwelling house for ,;; 40, 000. The contract pro-
vided. that the dwelling was to be constructed in accordance with 
written plans and specifications made a part of the contract; and 
further provided ,construction ~·rns to be completed and deli very 
made on or before December 31, 1974. On December 30th, Benson 
delivered the cor.1pleted dv1elling house over to Newcomb, and asked 
the latter to make the final construction installment payment of 
$8,000 one Neek later as required by the contract. Newcomb refused 
to make the payment of $8,000 on the contract date, and told Bens9n 
that he had no intention of making any further payments whatever. 
Benson promptly brought an action against Newcomb in the Circuit 
Court of the City of Suffolk asking damages of $8,000 for breach of 
contract. · Shortly thereafter, iJewco1::b duly filed his grounds of 
defense in which he denied breach of contract or anv indebtedness 
to Benson. l\t the same time, Newcomb filed a counterclaim contain-
ing two counts. The first count of the counterclaim alleged that 
the construction work performed by 3enson was defective and not in 
accordance with certain designated plans and specifications; and 
the count concluded with the averr,ient that Benson was liable to 
Newcomb for $10,000 arising out cf a breach of the construction con-
tract by Benson. The second count of the counterclaim alleged that 
on December 16, 1974,:?>enson had carelessly driven his autor.:iobile 
through a red light in the City of Suffolk, had thereby collided 
with an automobile driven by Hel·,rcom~:: causing Newcomb to sustain serious 
personal injuries; and the count concluded with the averment that 
Benson was liable to Newcomb for $25,000 arising out of the injuries 
sustained by Newcomb because of Benson's negligence. Benson has de-
murred to i'.Jewcomb vs counterclaim on the ground it is c1efecti ve by 
reason of a misjoin<ler of causes of action. 
How should· the Court rule on Benson's de~urrer? 
2. On October 13, 1974 Apex Printers, Inc. {Apex), which was 
engaged in business in the City of Danville, employed Alfred Craft 
as its General 'lanager. The employMent was made·pursuant to a valid 
written contract executed by Apex and by Craft, and provided that 
the employment was to be for a term of five years with-compensation 
at the rate of $30,000 per year. On November 14, 1974, at a duly 
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called raeeting of its Board of Jirectors, Apex fired Craft as 
Ge~eral r:anaqer effective at the close of business on the same 
day o On the -evening of Nover:iber l,Jth, Tom Swift the President 
of Aoex told Craft of the action of the Board of Directors, but 
refu~ed to tell Craft the reasons ~otivating the Doardo Shortly 
thereafter, Craft brought an action against Apex in the Circuit 
Court of the City of Danville seeking damages of $4.00,000 for 
breach of contract and for injury to his reputation. On the 
trial of the case, Craft introduced into evidence his contract 
with Apex; teztified as to its breach1 and testified that his 
discharg~ ha(J. Lecome generally known, and that, although he had 
tried dili']ently, he coulc1. not find employment elsewhere. ~:e 
then restell llis case. Swift, testifying for Apex~ confirmed that 
Craft had been fired anr~ 1 on cross-exaI;1ination, stated that the 
reason for the <lischarge of Craft was that a ~ajority of the 
3oara consiuere:::;. craft \·.1holly incompetent to perform his duties 
as General '.~anag<~r. A.fter th·~ jury Nas properly instructed, they 
retired and thereafter returned. ivith a verdict of $400, 000 in 
favor of Craft. :·711.en this verdict was announced, the jury was 
excused and counsel for .l'l~'.)ex movec~. the Court to set aside the 
verdict anc3. order a new trial on the ground that the jury's ver-
_dict ua.s excessive. Therupon, the Court said to counsel for l\.pex 
and for Craft, "Gentlemen, I feel that the verdict of t:1e jury 
is excessive and unsupported by the evidence o 'l'herefore, I put 
I:lr. Craft on the follo\'!ing terns - either accept a judgn:.ent for 
$150,000, rather than one for the $400,000 awarded by the jury, 
or I will sustain the defendant's notion and order a new trial." 
Counsel for Craft objected to the ruling of the Court asserting 
as his grounds that the jury had been duly convened, had heard 
all· the evidence and were the sole judges of the damages sustained 
by Craft, that the Court \·ms Ni thout po~1er to change the verdict, 
and could not usur;._:> the function of the jury in determining the 
amount of damages to which Craft was entitled. 
Wae this objection well taken? 
" 3 •;, ~am B:::,~d-~:. 'i::?J~:; ~o'Ja 7 r:b:;; a::e:e~~~ ~o::i 1 V<y 
nitted in the City of Petersburg. At the trial of the case in 
the Circuit Court of that City, the Commo.nwealth's Attorney 
rested his case without having proy~n that- ~he r~ry was corr.-
mi ttectin Petersburg. Thereupon, counsel for Barnes moved-the 
Court to strike the evidence of the Conmonwealth U::?On the ground 
that venEe __ Jl.g.~~.--not.-.be.en .. proven. The Court overruled the !notion 
and Barnes' counsel notea···fiTs e:>:ception. Counsel for Barnes then 
called Joe Turner as a witness for Barnes, and upon 'I'urner' s cross-
examination the Co:mmonwealth's Attorney showed that the robbery 
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had occurred in the City of Petersburg. At the conclusion of all 
the evidence in the case, cqunsel for Barnes renewed his motion 
to strike the evidence of the Commonwealth. That motion was also 
overruled and Barnes' counsel noted his exception. The jury 9 s 
verdict found 3arnes guilty as charged, and fixed the punishment 
at ten years in the penitentiary. The Court entered judgment 
sentencing Barnes accordingly. '11he Suprer.ie Court of Virginia 
granted Barnes an appeal from the judgment. Barnes' counsel as-
signed to the Supreme Court as error the action of the Circuit 
Court in overruling his original and renewed motions to strike 
the evidenc·e of the Com.vuonwealth. 
How should the Suprcr.1e Court rule on the 
assignment 0£ error? 
4. Helen Stevens has brought an action against Ajax Bakery, 
Inc. (Ajax}, a Virginia corporation, in the United States District 
Court for the tvestern District of Virginia, Harrisonburg Division. 
The complaint alleges thztt Ajax is engaged in an interstate bakery 
business with its principal office in .the City of Harrisonburg; 
that Helen Stevens answered an advertisement of Ajax by which she 
sought employment as a truck driver at an annual salary of $7,000i 
that Ajax refused to hire Helen f3tevens as a truck driver solely 
on the ground she ·was a female saying that those positions were 
only to be held by males~ that such denial of enployment was a 
violation of the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964; that Helen 
Stevens has taken all steps required by the Act before bringing the 
action; and that such refusal to hire has caused Helen Stevens to 
sustain damages of $7,000. Aja::-: has filed a r::totion- pursual'lt to 
Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure askini:J that the 
action of Helen Stevens be dismissed on the grounds (a) that·no 
diversity of citizenship has been all?ged or shown between the 
plaintiff and the defendant, and (b) that the damages sought are 
less than $10,000. 
How should the Court rule on each ground for dismissal? 
5. Plaintiff and Defendant inherited a bluegrass farm of 
1,000 acres consisting of 750 acres in :;;>u.laski County, Virginia, 
and 250 acres in the adjoining County of ~-1ythe. Plaintiff insti-
tuted in the Circuit Court of Hythe County a chancery suit for 
partition of this farm. Defendant filed an answer in which he 
alleged that the suit could not be maintained in that court be-
cause the greater portion of the farm was located in Pulaski 
County. 
1t.: 
(a) Did the answer assert a valid defense to 
the suit? 
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(b) State the proper procedure, or procedures, 
if there is more than one, by which plaintiff 
may test the legal sufficiency of the answer. 
6. Andrew, falsely representing himself as being the Sales 
f:.ianager of Brick, offered on Brick's behalf to sell and deliv~'.l:T 
to Builder 5,000 brick at $70 per thousand. Builder accepted"the 
offer. Without Brick 0 s knowledge, Andrew went to Brick's storage 
yard and loaded 5,000 brick on his truck. While on his way to 
deliver the brick to Builder, Andrew negligently injured Walker, 
but nevertheless Andrew continued on and delivered the brick. In 
connection with the investigation of the missing brick, Brick 
learned the foregoing facts. Be demanded of Builder payment of 
$70 per thousand for the 5,000 brick delivered, but Builder de-
clined to pay. Thereupon, Drick ins.tituted a contract action 
against Builder for the purchase price. Nhen Halker learned of 
the action against Builder, he demanded damages from Brick for 
his personal injuries. Brick now consults you as to his liability 
for Walkergs injuries~ 
(a) How ought you to advise him? 
(b) If, instead of having brought an action 
in contract against Builder for the pur-
chase price, Brick had brought an action 
against Builder for conversion, how ought 
you to advise Brick as to his liability to 
Walker? 
7. Unlucky Owner owned a large diamond ring, set in an un.:. 
usual mounting, which had been bequeathed to him by his Godfather. 
While attending an ice hockey game at the local civic center. Un-
lucky Owner lost the ring. It was found by Lucky Finder who sold 
it the next day to Tve Take Anything Pa\r.tn. Shop. Pawn Shop im-
mediately displayed the ring with other,expensive jewelry which 
it offered for sale to the public. Happy Consumer, in good faith 
and without any knowledge of its having been lost, purchased the 
diamond ring from Pawn Shop. Three months later while Unlucky 
Owner was riding in a bus he observed the ring on the finger of 
Happy Consumer. After Eappy Consumer refused to hand over the 
ring when Unlucky owner demanded it, Unlucky consults you and asks: 
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(a) ~-Jhat form of proceedin0 shoult\ he institute 
in an attei,tpt to recover the rin~J; and 
(b) ~Jhether he would be successful if :Iappy 
Consumer defended the case. 
Under these facts, how ought you to advise 
Unlucky Owner? 
8. i:Ierbert !'2i tchell brought an action against John Hankins 
in the CArcuit Court of Alber::i'arle County to recover damages for an 
allegedq,y_slanderous statement made by Hankinso In his motion for 
judgment, among other allegations, ?1itchell recited: 
"3o On the evening of ;1ay 14, 1974 the 
defendant Hankins, knowing full well his state-
ment was false, and only for the purpose of 
damaging the plaintiff ili tchell, wrongfully 
and maliciously stated to Tom Bent and -~'Jilliam 
Clark, ~You should never have anything to do 
with :Jerbert Uitchell. He is not to be trusted. 
He has defrauded me by selling me an oil paint-
ing which he said was a valuable antique, but 
which he knew was absolutely worthless.' 
11 4. The foregoing slanderous statement 
made by the defendant has injured the reputation 
of the plaintiff thus causing him .to, sustain 
damage of $10,000." 
In response to the motion for judgment, !-Iankins duly filed his 
grounds of def E:mse in which he denied making the slanderous state-
ment alleged by Hitchell. 
On the morning of november 11,\ 1974 when the case was 
set for trial, and shortly after the jury was oworn, Uitchell suf-
fered a heart attack, and the Court continued the case over gen-
erally. Mitchell never recovered from the attack, and died on 
December 18th. Upon hearing of 11itchell's death, the Court called 
upon counsel in the case to prepare and file a stipulation sub-
stantiating ;_'litchellas death. such a stipulation was prepared and 
executed by counsel for Uitchell and Hankins, and was duly filed 
in the Clerk's Office on January 9, 1975. The next day, the Court 
wrote the following letter to counsel: 
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"January 10, 1975 
Re: Mitchell v. Hankins 
11 To Counsel for both Parties: 
I am of the opinion that this case presents 
C\no actionable controversy before this Court. 
'·/The ref ore, and on my motion, I will direct that 
this action be dismissed and stricken from the 
docket. Counsel for the defendant may prepare 
and present for entry an appropriate order ef-
fecting this decision. 
/s/ John Abernathy, Judge 
Circuit Court of Albemarle County ii 
Upon receiving this cor:ununication from the Court, counsel for the 
decedent Hitchell filed the following written objections to the 
decision: (a) that the Court erred in its finding that there ·was 
no actionable controversy before it, and (b) that the Court was 
without authority to dismiss the action on its own motion and 
without consent of all parties. 
~"Jere either, or both, of these objections well taken? 
9. On February 6, 1975, Skylark obtained a judgment against 
Downbeat in the Circuit Court of Giles County for $7,000. Shortly 
thereafter Skylark obtained a writ of fieri facias from the Clerk 
of the Circuit Court of Giles County, retµrnable to the first day 
of the Ilarch term of the Circuit Court which will begin on r1arch 4, 
1975. Doi-mbeat owned a two-acre tract of land on Helf Creek, in 
Giles County, upon which was located an unfurnished summer cottage. 
He also kept an old pleasure horse of little value on the property. 
Skylark learned that Downbeat also owned a stable of very valuable 
show horses which he kept on a farm in Bland County. Skylark re-
quested the Sheriff of Giles County to levy upon all of the above 
mentioned properties of Downbeat and to sell them in order to sat-
isfy his judgment. 
(a) r·Jhich of the properties, if any, are subject 
to levy and sale by the Sheriff? 
(b) If any of the properties are subject to levy 
and sale, when must the levy be made? t1hen 
must the sale be made? 
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10. Winnie Winsome filed a bill of complaint against her 
husband, Robert, in the Circuit Court of Campbell County, alleg-
ing that he had committed adultery on numerous occasions between 
September l and Decerilier 1, 1974, and prayed for a divorce a 
vinculo ~atrimonii. Robert filed an answer in which he asserted 
the defepS-e of recrimination alleging that Winnie, during the 
period Jtine to September 1, 1974, had been guilty of cruelty and 
constructive desertion. On a hearing ore tenus, the Court found 
that the evidence was sufficient to support Hinnie's charge of 
adultery but also found that the evidence was sufficient to sus-
ta~n Robert's charge of cruelty and constructive desertion. 
"'1. ro What relief, if any, should the Court grant J . . ' .u · 
t.VV' 0!I to the parties, or either of them? 
